economic crisis. Britain had borrowed heavily from these countries during the war and could not afford to pay its debts. India was one of the hardest hit countries and was in desperate need of US dollars to pay for imports from non-sterling nations. The Commonwealth Finance Ministers initially met in London in July 1949 to discuss the sterling crisis, and agreed to increase exports to dollar markets and cut dollar imports by 25 per cent. 5 As a country that relied heavily on trade with other Commonwealth countries, Canada was concerned by the idea of trade restrictions. Canadian officials attended the Tripartite Economic Conference along with Britain and the United States in Washington in September 1949, and realized that in order to mitigate the problem, the rest of the sterling area had to be involved in the discussions in an even more authoritative forum than regular committees in London. 6 This meant that both foreign ministries and finance ministries were involved in the Colombo Conference from the start, setting the stage for even more detailed economic discussion.
The conference began in January 1950 as two separate meetings, one upstairs with the foreign ministers, and the other downstairs with the finance ministers. 7 Upstairs, Gulam Mohammad, Pakistan's minister of finance, and D. S. Senanayake, the Prime
Minister of Ceylon, both spoke of the necessity of economic development in their opening remarks. They introduced the matter gradually but never fully elaborated on it.
Development did not become a full topic of discussion until Pearson suggested that the two conferences could gain through cooperation. Before the first week was over, the two meetings had appropriately come together in a room halfway up the staircase joining the two levels. It was evident that the British were key to the success or failure of the Colombo Plan and Cabinet initially chose to take whatever action they did. 35 Once Britain had decided to become full members, Canada followed suit. In fact, Escott Reid did not think it would have been possible for Pearson to convince the Cabinet that the plan was a good idea had it not been for the fact that it was a Commonwealth scheme that would benefit its newest members: India, Pakistan and Ceylon. 36 The fact that in 1950, Asia represented all of the non-white Commonwealth countries made it easy to use imperial rhetoric to mobilize efforts to help the Commonwealth. 37 Yet it was also glaringly apparent that Canada could not supply the dollar aid alone. American involvement was imperative. The US was ambiguous about the amount of aid they were willing to contribute, although the
U.S. State Department expressed interest in the draft report of the Plan in September 1950. At the end of the London conference, where the Colombo Plan for Cooperative
Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia was officially drafted, the key players were hesitant to make any firm financial contributions. Canada was clearly
waiting to see what decisions would be made by Britain and the US before taking action.
In cabinet, the debate was far from over. It would take them the following five months, from September to January, to reach a conclusion about their contribution to the Colombo Plan. Uncertainty about the aims and purpose of aid programs was a large concern for the Canadian government. was pushed to the forefront. 45 The end result of the conference was a recommendation that Canada contribute $25 million annually, an increased amount that was proposed in light of the increase in security concerns.
Even considering the communist threat and the Korean War, this $25 million proposal was met with opposition from Cabinet. St. Laurent's support was "at best lukewarm." 46 Pearson, however, convinced him to change his mind. Pearson wrote to St.
Laurent the day before Cabinet met to decide on the issue and argued that the Colombo Plan provided the opportunity to facilitate better Indian-American relations. 47 As an avid supporter of internationalism and Canada's role as linchpin in international relations, St.
Laurent was convinced. Pearson also correctly assumed that St. Laurent would want to discuss the Plan in a positive light at the upcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime
Ministers. 48 Pearson's speech in the House of Commons on February 21 also highlighted the ongoing discussions with India regarding the purchase of Canadian wheat with the funds provided as part of the Colombo Plan. 49 This wheat deal was integral in convincing that other member countries hold up their end of the bargain. 51 Pearson wasted no time in mentioning that "Canadians, as individuals -and this has been clearly reflected in the press from one end of the country to the other -wish to contribute to the success of this plan. The desire of the people of Canada, to extend assistance, has also been clearly shown in the debate on the speech from the throne." He recognized that public opinion in
Canada was almost unanimously supportive of assistance to the Colombo Plan, a fact that Cabinet could not ignore.
The role of the US had also been an important factor in Canadian decision- and were slow to commit to anything that was not clearly in Canadian interests, especially when not all the facts were presented and all options explored. Only when the clear benefits to Canada became evident did they fully endorse the Plan and manage to persuade Cabinet to support it as well. It is pleasant to believe that Canada began its legacy of bilateral international aid during its 'golden era' of diplomacy because of humanitarian concerns. Although these played a supporting role, the main reasons for
Canada's contributions to the Colombo Plan were driven by national self-interests.
